

Public and political debates on multicultural crises in Denmark

A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship: Legal, Political and Educational Challenges - EMILIE

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1. Introduction: Danish historical context and debates on multiculturalism

The situation in Denmark as an immigrant country may be summarised in a few sentences. A European late comer in terms of large scale migration – the immigration has mainly consisted of work migrants and their descendants from Muslim countries (Turkey, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia) to begin with, and then from the seventies through the eighties and nineties, increasingly of refugees from mainly Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and Somali. Denmark was also late in formulating comprehensive national policies on integration, let alone policies accommodating cultural difference.

Broadly speaking, the country has gone through a long process of loss of national innocence (Mouritsen 1995) with progressively tightened policies in the areas of refugee handling and integration, and a very poor record of migrant incorporation, particularly in terms of labour market integration. Since the mid nineties the country has seen a long period of politicisation of integration and refugee issues, particularly focussing on Muslims, and to a large extent influenced by the increasingly influential extreme (new) right parties, presently the Danish People's Party (DPP). From 2001 when the present government coalition of the Liberal and Conservative parties came into power (strongly relying on the DPP) further restrictions and toughened political discourse have been seen. The government from the beginning adopted a successful fear-of-immigration platform, which foreign commentators – and the Council of Europe's Human Rights Secretary - found difficult to distinguish from that of the far right. Most recently, the publication by Jyllands-Posten of the cartoons depicting Muhammad caused an extensive and polarised public debate – and a prolonged foreign policy crisis – from which the country has yet to recover. Even so, this crisis, lamented by many in Denmark, has also fed into a process of new national assertiveness, stressing an uncompromising stance on 'our democratic values', by a large part of the electorate and the present government.

These developments, their longer historical perspectives and the present legal and institutional details, have been substantially discussed in the preliminary EMILIE-report on the migration situation in Denmark (Mouritsen & Olsen 2006). The purpose of the present report is to examine the content of public discourse on multicultural crises in the country in more detail. The chosen case study concerns the present government's 'turn to citizenship', including citizenship contracts, declarations, and tests – all of which amount to a very substantial shift in discourse and policy for a country with no strong tradition of conceptualising citizenship, which had to import a new word from Sweden (*medborgerskab*) for this purpose. More particularly, this case study examines the background and content of parliamentary debates on naturalisation, i.e. the yearly laws being passed which list the names of new citizenship applicants. The second part of the report presents an account and analysis of the Danish cartoon crisis in terms of main actors, and the content, dynamics and developments of claims making during the crisis. This section is more sociological, based on completely new research and very substantial data collections, and focussing on the perspectives of the Danish Muslim community as much as that of the ethnic majority and the politically dominant discourse. The following introduction and the general conclusion fit together the two case studies by offering a set of interpretative frames about the structure of Danish national identity and certain elements of political culture, the (lack of) policies of multicultural accommodation, and the concomitant discourse of cultural and religious difference

1.1. National identity and difference

Danish discourse on migration issues in general and conceptions of cultural-religious diversity and multiculturalism remains strongly influenced by a series of discursive structures connected to the development of the Danish nation and nation state, some of which go back to the advent of Danish nationalism, and some of which have a more recent origin (Hansen 2002, Mouritsen 2006, Mouritsen & Olsen 2006: 12-15).

Denmark is usually presented as a classical instance of the continental or 'German' Kulturnation. Apart from the limitations of the distinction cultural vs. civic nation (including, empirically, Germany's recent moves in a republican direction, see Gerdes & Faist, 2006) Denmark really represents a peculiar mix of 'cultural' (and 'ethnic') and 'civic'. The birth of the Danish nation, at any rate as a mass phenomenon, is usually (and correctly, we believe) associated with the liberal-nationalist modernisation program, which followed a series of defeats to Germany culminating in the loss of the border region Schlesvig in 1864, whereby Denmark became an almost pure Danish language nation (apart from the colonies, Faeroe Islands and Greenland far away). This also coincided, as a special Danish feature, with liberalisation and early democracy, beginning with the abrupt shift from absolutism to introduction of a very liberal constitution in 1849.

Before this period, it makes sense, following Korsgaard (2004) and Damsholt (2000) to place two defining moments in the development of a Danish people. The first is associated with the extremely heavy handed Danish reformation (1536) whereby all church land became the property of the king and religious education was introduced in schools and children were taught to read in order to be taught scripture¹ (much earlier than traditional accounts of nation building has it). From above and over a long period this process created a *Christian* people, not as a nation but as the God-fearing household² of the Christian king (whose name was *Christian* the 3rd). In Denmark, the Lutheran separation of the secular and churchly realms (see below) in fact instituted a state church, which continues in existence (although the Danes, significantly, call it 'The people's Church (*Folkekirken*). Although most Danes do not attend church and are also non-believers – some sociology of religion-related details notwithstanding – a large majority continue to be members of the National church. A second early element of Danish people-hood was the development in the Danish 'composite state' (comprising Denmark, Norway, and the German speaking duchesses Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenborg, and earlier on also Sweden) with a form of constitutional patriotism, briefly discussed in the introduction to the section on Danish citizenship. This collective identity associated notions of the good, patriotic citizen with living on the (good, protective, and enlightened) King's territory, and serving the state – wherever one's birth place and whatever one's native language.

¹ And tied, incidentally, to citizenship: If a person was unable, at the age of 18 to master Luther's catechism, he or she might in principle be thrown in jail or be deported,

² *Folk* in Danish also bears the meaning of 'household', 'servants' or (later on) 'workers' and 'employees'.

The emergence of Danish nationhood from 1848-1864 was really a dual development³, evidenced by the stakes of the internal conflict – a kind of civil war centring in the borderlands, largely left out of Danish history books – which followed the 1849 constitution. On the one hand, most major political forces favoured establishing constitutional rights, including quite extensive (male) democracy. On the other hand, nationalists (national liberals) and ‘cosmopolitians’ disagreed as to the boundaries and the identity – in terms of language and territory (not religion, as all were Lutherans) – of the new democratic people that had been created. Those who thought that only Danish speakers could be part of the nation and that certain German speaking territories were ‘really’ Danish (and, hence, that their inhabitants had to be rendered Danish) ‘won’ (leading to the war with Germany).

Many elements of Danish national identity and mental history (Østergaard 1992) can be traced to the period that followed, in terms of their sociological origin and their narrative content – even to the extent that many politicians employ popularised (and idealised) versions of this account of Danish nation building in a reflective manner. Together, they make up the peculiar cultural-ethnic-civic mix, which still constitutes a discursive vocabulary, from which participants draw in debates – also debates on migration and multiculturalism. Four semantic and narrative clusters stand out:

First, *language* became an important element (along with the usual suspects: landscape, ancient (Nordic) heroes, wars, the people’s ‘soul’), being a main stake in the struggle in early national poetry and the writings of the to this day extremely influential poet-philosopher-educator J.F.S. Grundtvig. Language is no longer a particularly strong element, at an open discursive level at any rate, of main stream (as opposed to that of the far right) nationalist discourse *vis-à-vis immigrants*, but the importance of having a single language of communication, of maintaining good Danish (against English), and of mastery of Danish as a condition of entering the labour market and ‘functioning’ in society remain very pronounced.

Secondly, *smallness* (‘Denmark is a small country’), *cultural homogeneity* (‘the Danes are really a tribe’), and the tight knit ‘cosiness’ of Danish society, which is the traditional stuff of usually rather ambivalent ethnographic descriptions of the culture that meets the sojourning foreigner⁴, and which, arguably, owes much to 20th century homogenising processes in schools and through national monopoly TV, has been a staple of recent discourse on cohesiveness. At least since the Danish accession to the EC, which marked the beginning of a Danish small state, anti-federalist euro-scepticism (against the scheming, French-speaking, faraway elites in Brussels) and remains a very strong element in the, all things equal, scepticism of cultural pluralism in Denmark.

³ Incidentally, the parallel processes of state and nation building, combined with linguistic and ethnic homogeneity has had, as a main consequence, that it is conceptually very difficult to imagine the ‘nation’ or ‘the people’ *without* the state (and its institutional elements, particularly welfare distribution, political democracy, and education), as particularly evidenced in Danish Euro scepticism (Mouritsen & Olsen, forthcoming)

⁴ Robert Molesworth, British ambassador to Denmark and friend and contemporary of John Locke had little positive to say about Denmark, its food, customs and generally *mediocre* people, although he did note that surprising numbers could read and write (Molesworth 1693)

Thirdly, cultural homogeneity and smallness are tied to specific conceptions of *egalitarianism* and *democracy*. Through the work of Grundtvig, and associated with the institution and ideology of the folk high schools (*folkehøjskolen*) (originally for the sons and daughters of the relatively well off independent peasants and farmers, but not husbandmen or the growing class of urban workers), a tradition of anti-authoritarianism, social liberalism, eye-to-eye solutions, and the value of social leveling have become highly influential elements of Danish public culture from left to right. These elements enter strongly into the contemporary post WW2 construction, now with the active participation of social democrats and the labour movement (Korsgaard 2004), of a civic nationalism which feeds on pride in Danish ('conversational', 'consensual', 'co-operative') democracy, on equality as a comprehensive structural feature of everyday life (particularly in terms of low power distance, gender relations, and children's education), and the welfare state. All of which are only really genuine in Danish public discourses (and selected other, mainly Scandinavian, countries).

This egalitarianism-liberal Danish nationalism – to which we return – has strong repercussions in a new multicultural situation in at least two ways. First of all, it has adverse consequences for the level of tolerance of cultural pluralism, when such pluralism embraces *other* values and virtues than those liberal, democratic ones, which characterise Denmark, which have become settled over a long period of time, and which are, in the nature of things, superior expressions of the fundamental principles in question.

However, Danish style egalitarianism, when tied to the welfare state in its universalistic form and reinforced by the traditional emphasis on sameness (negatively: conformity, not sticking one's head out), also constitutes a formidable entry barrier for immigrants. The condition of solidarity in Denmark which is constantly underlined in the governmental discourse, is the ability to work *and pay taxes*, and hence contribute to the reciprocity and mutuality of the welfare state. The welfare state is both a mutual insurance scheme and a *system of mutual symbolic recognition* where dignity and equal status depends on one's ability (if one is not sick, handicapped, retired, on maternity leave, studying, or temporarily unemployed) to do one's share according to one's abilities. In a situation of otherwise high employment (as presently in Denmark) conspicuous cultural (and religious) difference will almost automatically, and whether or not it is an 'objective' barrier to unemployment, be represented as unwillingness to integrate or at least as a dire need to 'learn Danish values' so as to achieve the requisite competences to 'function' in Denmark (Hedetoft 2006).

Fourthly, Lutheran *religion* continues to play an important role. Again with Grundtvig as the poetic medium, the narrative of peasant liberation – materialised in the tradition of the Folk high school – is one of spiritual *awakening*. Here, the escape from the tutelage of the rural class society into a status of free and independent peasant-citizen, practiced by generations of farmer sons and daughters 'lifting their eye from the plough to heaven' (as they left for their six month stay in the folk high school), is associated with Christianity. However it is a 'this-worldly', 'happy' Christianity, idealising what Grundtvig spoke of in one of his songs as a 'modest, active, happy life on earth' (*et jævnt og muntert, virksomt liv på jord*). However, and by contrast to the association with *enlightenment* in the French tradition of nationalism (reason, rationality), the Grundtvigian-Lutheran notion of awakening, while also associated with 'light', emphasises the individual (but also the collective, national) *struggle* for what one be-

believes in and the vitalist notion of personal growth through such struggle. 'Open mindedness' (*frisind*) in most of its uses, denotes this upright 'struggle for everything that you hold dearly' ('*kæmp for alt hvad du har kært*')⁵ but also tolerance in a non-relativistic, friendly confrontational way, in the beliefs of others. Liberty, here (in connection with *frisind*) becomes a form of deep public autonomy, i.e. the virtue of standing up for one's beliefs, rather than enjoying one's privacy and rights. In Denmark, there is 'Freedom for Loke as well as for Tor' (Grundtvig again).⁶

Like language, religion nowadays is not a very explicit element of the dominant discourses on 'who we are' let alone what immigrants need to be - again, with the exceptions of the far right and some, quite influential elements of the governing Liberal party. However, despite of the decline of traditional religious belief and practice in Denmark, a discourse of 'cultural Christianity' and (more elite based) 'Lutheran individualism' is quite strong. In these discourses some of the above elements become recycled in a manner which places Islam in an unfavourable light⁷. Here, 'good' religiosity becomes associated with 'independence', an existential-individualist attitude, as well as with religion as a carrier of cultural heritage. Sometimes liberalism, secularisation, and the ability to separate one's religion from one's political dealings become presented as *presupposing* the specific brand of Danish Lutheranism (in contrast to, on the one hand, Catholicism, bible belt fanaticism and Islam, and, on the other hand, the superficial, 'relativist', ideological stances of left wing secularism) (Mouritsen 2006).

Each of these elements, as we shall see, enter into the discourse on issues of integration and multiculturalism and are constitutive in a variety of ways of the new civic integrationist discourse (see also Müller, forthcoming) which has characterised the approach of the present government and which constitutes a highly moralised form of liberal perfectionism.

1.2. Multiculturalism in Denmark: Policies and discourses

On the background of the above account of Danish national identity, it may come as no surprise that debates on the 'crisis' of multiculturalism appear slightly misplaced from a Danish academic perspective. In spite of a great deal of discursive opposition of 'multicultural ideology', which is associated with illiberalism and politically correct value relativism, no important group or constituency favours multiculturalism, if this is taken to mean a comprehensive, normatively grounded political program of accommodating cultural minority needs. There is no influential ideology of multiculturalism, which remotely corresponds to academic theories, either liberal, communitarian, or post-modern, or to official or semi-official programs of, say, Canada, Australia, Britain

⁵ Christian Richard's hymn *Altid frejdig når du går* from 1867 has later been associated with the resistance to German occupation and its post WW2 commemorations in Denmark.

⁶ In fact, the implied relation of tolerance is not between equally worthy partners. Tor is the upright, freedom-loving (liberal) God of Thunder, whereas Loke was the scheming coward who killed Balder, favourite of all the Gods of Nordic mythology. Tolerance is practiced by the righteous from a position of authority and strength in own belief.

⁷ This goes some way towards explaining what is at stake when a European record shows that 31% answers confirmatively to the question "Do you personally find the presence of people of another *religion* disturbing in your daily life" (EUMC 2000 survey, European Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna).

or Sweden. While many policy measures are directed towards minorities in the sense of targeting such problems as poor labour market integration, there is also precious little in the way of multicultural policy to report. Following a standard typology, the discourses on citizenship and integration, which have prevailed since the seventies place Denmark in the 'ethnic assimilationist' or 'communitarian' corner (Koopmans & Statham 2000: 20-22).

Before the politicisation of migration issues in the nineties, which in 1998 led the Social democrat Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen to assure his electorate that "Denmark is not and will never become a multiethnic society" (cited in Togeby 1998), it was possible to detect a small degree of 'multicultural incorporation' in Danish policy formulations and institutionalized initiatives. Importantly, local authorities were obliged to offer state financed training in native language (modersmålsundervisning). This was abolished in 2002 with the argument that the most (or only) important instrument for integration of children is training in the Danish language, following a specialised debate on whether or not native language training facilitates the learning of a second language, but with no debate of either the (cultural or commercial) value of diversity or the right of citizens to have their linguistic heritage protected. Now, native language education is subject to the political will (and financial capacities) of local authorities.

Another step is the removal of any mentioning of the value of cultural preservation from the Law on Integration, where this previously enjoyed a (not very prominent) place (see page 16 below, and Lex 2006). Cultural heritage preservation lives a life of its own in local communities, where integration policies are carried out in close connection with the immigrants and their organizations. There are no formulations on positive cultural rights which exceed the principle of equal treatment in the Law on Integration. And 'equal treatment' is generally understood as treatment on the conditions of the majority culture, leaving only liberal rights to self-financed and self-organised activities in civil society, including the right to wear religious head gear in schools – although local school regulations may discourage it. Muslims or other minorities have the same right to establish their own schools⁸, mosques and other cultural or religious associations as Danish cultural groups, but there is no obligation from the state to finance those activities. It has taken the largest Muslim organisation in Denmark fifteen years to get (again, local) permission to establish a Muslim cemetery in a suitable place, and despite some public debate on this, there it is out of the question to get official support to build a real Mosque in a country with thousands of (little used) Lutheran churches.

The liberal, colour blind approach to integration and cultural diversity is evident across the political spectrum. Policy formulations speak of the *individual* immigrant, as in an early government report according to which "There should be no special rights for

⁸ That Muslims and other cultural minorities can establish their own schools according to the Law on Free Schools can be viewed as an anomaly in the midst of the Danish philosophy of integration. Free Schools are established and led by groups of parents and funded by the state and have a long historical pedigree. Schools are, to a large degree, free to educate children according to separate curricula and didactic methods. However, rules concerning this have recently been tightened following public debate about Muslim schools – an issue to be looked into in the 'Educational Challenges' report from the Danish team.

immigrants. The mutual tolerance between immigrants and Danes, which is so important, is best achieved by equal treatment according to the government" (Ministry of internal affairs, Redegørelse 1992). To members of one of the most immigrant friendly and pluralism accepting party (The Radical Liberal Party), "the constitutional State must step into force in order to make it clear to everybody that the constitutional rights of every individual is above any consideration to cultural traditions" (Ammitzbøll, Khader og Nielsen 2006).

Taking culture into consideration in policy is generally regarded as a form of unequal treatment which jeopardises integration and which is not in the interest of the individual. *Cultural diversity* in the dominant discourse tends to be a code for the existence of an inferior (un-western, un-modern, un-civilised) culture ('their culture') in the midst of 'our culture'. The latter, in line with the new civic nationalism, by contrast is *both* particular (ours, Danish, historically founded etc.) and superiorly liberal, placed on the right side of the modern civilisation divide. In this regard, a progressive centrist discourse (again, found in the Radical Liberal Party) which emphasises the need to 'be open to other cultures in order to improve our own culture/understand it better' sounds slightly odd in a context, where it is unclear what even progressives would wish to learn from the stereotype Muslim, given that 'our culture' is already associated with democracy, liberty etc. (Mouritsen 2006). In a situation where 'our culture' is liberal and modern and 'their culture' is the opposite, the association of any positive account of cultural diversity with an unhealthy value relativism begins to make sense. The only places for a diversity discourse in Denmark is the ethno-cultural supermarket of life style, food, and art, and – to a growing degree – the world of business, where large corporations are starting to place a premium on (marketable) cultural assets, such as the mastery of Arabic language.

The negative connotations of (their) culture cultural diversity in Denmark to a large degree reflect that culture stands for religion and *visa versa*. *Religion as culture*, here signifying a pseudo-anthropological notion of culture as a prison to be escaped from, or a traditional (authoritarian) way of life which is inhabited unreflectively. Religion as traditional culture is opposed to religion in the sense outlined above, as an existential, individual decision to include a spiritual dimension in one's life⁹. Hence, for instance in debates on the head scarf issue, Muslim actors often attempt to escape the notion of 'culture' altogether, replacing it with 'religion' – and attempting to give the latter a 'protestant', existential interpretation.

A final element of the diversity discourse is related to what was noted above about egalitarianism and the ability to participate in the welfare state and the labour market. Perhaps the most negative diversity marker in Denmark is not cultural diversity *in and by itself*. It is the spectre of the 'parallel society' which, in the dominant discourse, represents *both* a situation where a class of citizens (residents) are excluded from the material reciprocity and dignity of the welfare community, and where these individuals share different and opposing (illiberal) values which stand in the way of their full access to this community. The neo-liberal version is to threaten newcomers with exclu-

⁹ And as opposed to what, confusingly in the context of the present argument, is called 'cultural Christianity' (and by secular minded Muslims echoed with 'cultural Islam'), i.e. religion as a valuable heritage, from which modern individuals may seek moral inspiration and guidance in a non-doctrinaire manner.

sion from this community lest they quickly acquire the competences. The social democratic version, which is not very different in fact, places slightly more emphasis on social citizenship as a way to include newcomers (rather than as a price to be won, when one has proved one's welfare-civic capacities).

2. National case study: The citizenship issue

Full citizenship is the final, if not the most consequential, gate to pass in the quest for full membership of a political community (Hammar 1994). In recent years, citizenship as a legal status and a bundle of specific rights, but also as a form of belonging, invested with cultural pathos, has become highly politicised in Denmark. From 2001 when the liberal/conservative government took office a political battle has taken place on the terms and conditions and normative content of citizenship. The government has been heavily pressured by the Danish People's Party, which thinks that the practice of granting citizenship has been a "catastrophe and betrayal of Denmark as a nation inhabited by a people" (Krarup 2005a). Consequently, in 2005 the government initiated many new reforms.

The following sections look into these developments, describing discourses on citizenship and naturalisation before, during and after the Agreement on Citizenship in December 2005. We begin with a little background on Danish citizenship categories and ending, and later proceed to analyse, as a main object of this paper, parliament debates on the discretionary granting of citizenship to foreign residents.

2.1 Danish citizenship

Following the shift to a liberal/conservative government in 2001, rules and regulations on immigration and access to citizenship have been generally tightened, quantitatively and qualitatively.¹⁰ Terms and conditions of access have been restricted at all gates (temporary asylum, permanent residence, citizenship) and the level of detail in the regulation of immigrants has risen. First, foreign residents' social rights have been curtailed with the advent of an 'introductory benefit', a social benefit well beneath the lowest level available to native Danes. This was followed by a new political integration program which was very labour market orientated ('A new chance for all'). With it came a series of detailed individual contracts and declarations: These included a special 'integration contract' to be signed as part of the elaborate official integration program increasing the number of obligations (attending language school, active job search, even active social and political community participation) that foreigners incur if they wish to receive financial support – an instance of the liberal/conservative government's *quid pro quo* proving-one's-ability-to-contribute-philosophy. The minimum age for applicants of family reunification on the basis of marriage was changed from eighteen to twenty-four years, the hotly debated 24-year rule, officially to prevent forced (and arranged) marriages. Not less important is the 'Declaration on Integration' (for applicants of family reunification), and the 'Declaration on integration and active citizenship in Danish Society' (for everybody with temporary residence who apply for permanent residence). Soon after came the 'Agreement on Citizenship' (*Indfødsretsaf-*

¹⁰ See Mouritsen's & Olsen's preliminary report (2006).

talen, Ministry of integration 2005) which met the wishes of the Danish People's Party for much stricter citizenship requirements, and introduced a test in Danish history, culture, and society. Thus, during 2005 and 2006 the level of detail in regulation, and of normative explicitness and moral and behavioural control increased enormously, with the clear aim of rendering explicit the required attitudes, norms, and values for prospective residents and citizens in Denmark: "For too long it has been a taboo to communicate the Danish rules of the game to immigrants in a clear manner. [...] We used to wrap up our rules in cotton wool when immigrants arrived in the country. Now we formulate some clear rules" (Jakobsen 2005, citing the Minister for Integration Rikke Hvilshøj).

The Agreement on Citizenship (*indfødsretsaftalen*) (Ministry of Integration, 2005) is the most recent and far reaching initiative taken on citizenship. While it takes seven years (as opposed to earlier only 3) to obtain permanent residence permit a minimum of eight years for refugees and nine years for others (but usually longer) to obtain Danish citizenship. Applicants must have been self-supporting in four out of five years, have no debt to the state or (serious or recent) criminal convictions, and need to pass a language test, where a chat with a police officer previously sufficed. On top of this they must take an oath of loyalty and a 'citizenship test' (see below). Foreigners who were born and raised in Denmark cannot any longer, as previously, hand in a declaration about Danish citizenship when they reach maturity, but must go through all steps of the naturalisation procedure. If 'young criminal second generation immigrants' face expulsion to 'home countries' they can no longer simply declare themselves Danish citizens. Finally, 'society threatening crime' (terrorist acts) can result in loss of citizenship (unless one thereby becomes stateless).

Citizenship – the concept(s)

Of concern here are not these legal developments as much as the controversies and discourses accompanying them. Citizenship, in Danish, is divided into three distinct concepts. First, *Medborgerskab* refers to the status of a *fellow* citizen, not so much in terms of rights (or the full range of citizenship rights) as in terms of living on the same territory and sharing the same social goods (welfare state services), and also in terms of being recognised as 'one of us' (the prefix *medborger* literally means citizen *with* (us)). This recognition in turn has connotations of equality, in a Marshallian sense of equal social and material status, but also in recent years in terms of active contribution to social and political life and engagement with one's community. This latter, modern day republican connotation returns to an early discourse of *borger* and *borgerdyd* (civic virtue) which prevailed in royalist or Jacobin inspired patriotic political and cultural elites of the Danish composite state around 1800 – before the rise of small state nationalism following the disastrous loss of territory to Germany (Damsholt 2000). Although *ideals* of community involvement are historically strong across political divides in Denmark neither this nor a more liberal, legal/rights-centred concept of citizenship was much used in Denmark in the 20th century. Civic virtue (*borgerdyd*) retains a distinctly pompous and bourgeois connotation. An etymological reason may be that Danish language, like German, only possesses the first half of the burgher/citizen, borghese/cittadino, bourgeois/citoyen distinction: *borger*, *borgerlig*, which has connotations of upper class privilege and the political right. *Medborgerskab*,

originally a Swedish concept associated with the *Folkhem*, was imported for social science research purposes in the early nineties.¹¹ From the late nineties this concept has propelled towards the centre of Danish political discourse. It is constantly used by the government, and structures the website portal of the Ministry of Integration. Here it denotes (compared to the traditional use in Sweden) somewhat more demanding and potentially exclusive aspects – citizenship is a solemn, valuable prize that needs to be earned, with the full range of legal, identity- and activity-related elements of the term.

The second concept, which has a much more restricted meaning, is *statsborgerskab* and simply denotes the legal category or status of citizenship in a state. Finally, there is *indfødsret*, the old term for *statsborgerskab*, which literally means ‘the right of the native born.’ *Indfødsret* was created in 1772 on the initiative of Danish burghers as a (largely ineffective) means of excluding what was seen as a dominant German speaking administrative class in Copenhagen (Tudvad 2002). Interestingly, however, *Indfødsret* is still the legal term used in most contexts, the point being that the status of full Danish citizenship remains a birthright at the etymological level, only to be granted sparingly to others. Legally, Denmark adheres to a relatively strict principle of *ius sanguinis*. Citizenship is obtained at birth if one parent is a Danish citizen. But foreigners can obtain citizenship through naturalization after eight-nine years of legal residence. However, once applications have been approved by the Ministry – following procedures outlined in a moment – names of individual applicants are entered into the actual bill (‘lovforslag om indfødsrets meddelelse’) to be discussed and voted on in parliament with the possibility of amendments. Citizenship/*indfødsret* is *not* in fact a right, but a discretionarily granted privilege by the Danish people, through its representatives.

It is a peculiar fact that citizenship has been rendered so solemn and intensely politicised at a time when the material substance of (social) rights and services, as part of a neo liberal turn, are increasingly tied (also for the native born) to actual and *employed* residence, rather than legal citizenship (Mouritsen & Olsen 2006: 8).

2.2. Policing the gates: ‘Danes and citizens’, declarations, and tests

The normative content of Danish citizenship has been demonstrated in a number of ways over the last few years. Before proceeding to look at the parliamentary debates we shall briefly discuss some recent events and government initiatives, which also shed light on aspects of Danish citizenship.

Criminals and (native) citizens

In the first events citizenship is treated as protection. Under which conditions should a person be left *unprotected*? In 2003 an Italian tourist in Copenhagen was brutally murdered by two brothers aged eighteen and nineteen of Palestinian origin. They subsequently received long prison sentences. After losing a Supreme Court appeal they will also be expelled after the prison term has ended. Increasingly tough legislation

¹¹ Per Mouritsen recalls organizing a seminar on citizenship in 1996 where the concept was only used in inverted commas.

facilitates expulsion of hundreds of individuals without citizenship each year. In this case, however, one of the sentenced was born and raised in Denmark, while the other had come at the age of three (Buch 2005). Although right wing parties champion expulsions of criminals without citizenship the Danish population is among the least supportive in Europe of this practice (Eurobarometer 64). Criticism of the sentence was widespread because the brothers were seen as 'our criminals' who had been part of Danish society and whose behaviour was somehow 'our responsibility'.

By contrast, when approximately five thousand individuals with Danish passports were evacuated from Lebanon in summer 2006 because of the reactions towards Danish citizens in the aftermath of the drawings of Muhammad, the relatively widespread opinion had it that these individuals might well be Danish citizens (*statsborgere*), but they were not, as it were, compatriots (*medborgere*). Many had been given asylum, and yet were now apparently long term visitors, with Danish pocket money, in the country where they were allegedly persecuted. One liberal minister wished to present local councils with lists of the evacuated to check if social benefits had been claimed illegally. There were indeed indications of widespread fraud in this particular group. Citizens or not, why should these people be helped if they were exploiting the Danish welfare state? (Den Danske Forening 2006).

If so far each incident illustrates an idea of reciprocity and interdependency as condition of citizenship protection, the Lebanese story also had a more sinister side. As the originally reported 'some' citizens in distress grew to thousands, and as images of large scale evacuation hit TV screens, it was apparent that these citizens, many of whom required instruction in Arabic, were not regular tourists. The news media denoted them 'Danish citizens' (*danske statsborgere*) to avoid the more regular term 'Danes' (*danskere*) which was conspicuous from two sides. Both for (a few) progressives who thought national media should make no such distinction, and for those (more numerous) to whom these were neither real Danes nor deserving citizenship, *a fortiori* when Ministerial officials were discovered to have assisted a category, officially referred to as Danes, who merely had Danish residence or family ties. An ethnicised hierarchy became apparent, whereby native Danes *automatically* were more deserving of protection than Lebanese-Danish citizens, who had yet to earn it.

Declaring one's virtues

The third event is the introduction by the liberal conservative government of an 'Integration declaration'. Two versions in fact exist. Spouses who become reunited with refugees in Denmark must sign a *Declaration on active participation in acquiring Danish language skills and achieving integration into Danish society* (Ministry of Integration 2006a). This short document requires the signer to "make active efforts to become self-supporting through gainful employment", "make active efforts to learn the Danish language", "make active efforts to acquire an understanding of the fundamental norms and values of Danish society", "make active efforts to participate in the life of the community", "participate actively in any introductory program I am offered", and "make active efforts to facilitate the integration of my children by working with day-care centres, schools, etc. to ensure that they acquire Danish language skills as early as possible and that they receive instruction in their own learning". It ends with the statement that "I am aware that in Denmark principles apply such as the need for

respect and for equal opportunities for boys and girls to develop; that adults are obliged to listen to their children; and that corporal punishment is prohibited. Moreover, I am aware that schools are subject to principles governing participation of children and parents in the decision making process and cooperation between parents and school". The emphasis on learning the language, co-operating with schools and kindergartens to integrate children (including girls), and – as the first priority – becoming self-supporting reflect the ambition to send a very clear message of what refugees are expected to do (and not do).

A longer 16 point declaration (Ministry of Integration 2006b) to be signed when an individual enters an integration program or before applying for permanent residence states with even more clarity (and lack of sensitivity) how Denmark expects newcomers to conform to Danish ways. Apart from learning the language, supporting oneself, and being 'active' in all sorts of ways, it includes such items as:

- "I shall comply with Danish legislation" and "protect the Danish democratic principles in every respect"
- "I understand and accept that men and women have equal obligations and rights in Denmark and that both ... shall contribute to society," including "rights – and in some cases obligations – to education and work, and ... to take part in the democratic process. Both men and women have an obligation to pay taxes and to undertake parental obligations"
- "... all children shall be given equal respect and self-expression – be they boy or girl – in order to grow up and become active and responsible citizens who are capable of making their own decisions".

Moreover, applicants (including Westerners) must agree

- "... that circumcision of girls and the use of force to contract marriage is illegal in Denmark"
- "...that Danish society strongly condemns acts of terrorism and that any citizen has an obligation to fight terrorism".

By signing these statements newcomers state an intention to conform to Danish citizenship standards well before they can apply for citizenship, by the time of which they will have to prove that they were sincere and actually complied with the conditions. Each statement is a very specific declaration of Danish civic virtues. Most import to the present government, one must earn one's own keep – so as to be able to pay taxes (and hence participate in the reciprocity of the welfare state), be an active community member (not all natives are), and, importantly, conform to a Danish 'comprehensive liberalism' (Mouritsen 2006): One must be, and teach one's children to become autonomous and reflective and accept equality in all social and private spheres, including relations between the sexes and parents and children.

Interestingly, these declarations received very little public attention, although the patronising tone of the '16-points' provoked reactions from (particularly) westerners who had to sign them, as well as some ridicule from both left and right commentators (Flarup 2005; Søvndal 2006) who questioned whether they represented universally held Danish values and wondered if not hectoring them to newcomers would cause resentment. Taking together they reflect the 'particular universalism' of Danish values, both in the sense that universal values are presented as Danish and in the sense that certain (comprehensive) interpretations are stressed in a perfectionist 'assimilatory'

manner, whereby individuals are required to transform themselves, and whereby such enforced transformation of beliefs and habits – whatever their content – is not itself regarded as illiberal (Mouritsen 2006).

Testing citizenship

The civic virtues exhibited in the declarations are a mixture of neo-republican values (community involvement), comprehensive liberal democratic values (reflection, anti-authoritarianism), and 'welfare-state neo-liberal' values (the self-supporting taxpayer). However, a final government initiative suggests a stronger traditional cultural element in the quest for Danish citizenship. This is the introduction of a new test to be taken by new citizens, along with an oath of 'allegiance and loyalty to Denmark and Danish society' – all presupposing that the previously mentioned conditions have been met.

The multiple choice test – significantly called *indfødsretsprøven* (literally: 'test of right to be native born') – contains 40 questions from a pool of 200 and refers to educational material about Danish culture, history, society, and the political system published by the Ministry. Prospective citizens must have a correct score of 70%. Examples of questions include: "What is the name of the Danish national flag?", "Is it legal in Denmark to discriminate on the ground of racial or ethnic origin?", "In what city was H.C. Andersen born?", "What year did Denmark win the European championship in soccer?", and "What religion was brought to Denmark at the end of the 9th century by King Harald Blåtand?".

The introduction of the citizenship test clearly reflects a perception that membership and belonging is taken too lightly. The Minister of Integration wished to add *solemnity* to citizenship: "The decision to apply for Danish citizenship is a big step" (Hvilshøj 2007). It wishes to mark a symbolic distinction between foreigners with residence and regular citizens with full membership rights, making it harder to obtain and thereby increasing conscience about its value:

Citizenship is not just a piece of paper, but a declaration of belonging. It is a reward bestowed for meeting certain demands [...] It is not a matter of course that people who have lived here for nine years have actually become familiar with what it means to be Danish, or know the Danish language and history [...] It helps them function better as citizens, it makes sure that they love Denmark and prefer Denmark [...] It is educational: It shows what are important Danish values. We don't test people's opinions, but we hope to influence them (Hvilshøj on national radio, *P1 Debat* 01/03/2007).

Responding to criticism the Minister underlined that the test was not a way to practice government thought control:

It is very important for me to maintain the principle that I do not wish to test people's opinions or define what attitudes you have to have in order to be Danish (Hvilshøj, cited in Parker and Cordsen 2007).

However, some of the questions appear to tap cultural knowledge, for instance in the sense of familiarity with certain historical events and figures (see examples above). Arguably, citizenship is linked to a 'battle of culture' (*kulturkamp*) which has been going on in recent years in Denmark. Here, the perception of a cultural threat from Muslims has turned the definition of Danishness (*danskhed*) as a mixture of cultural and political elements into an important project also for elements of the centre right. In a speech about a literary *canon* of classical Danish works (commissioned by himself), the Minister of Culture noted that:

We have declared war on the multicultural ideology that says that everything is equal. If everything is equal, then everything is equally unimportant. And we will not accept that. A medieval Muslim culture will never be as valid here as that Danish culture, which has grown on this old piece of land [...] The cultural battle has now been going on for a few years. [...] There are still many battles to be fought. One of the most important ones concerns the confrontation that we experience when immigrants from Muslim countries refuse to recognize Danish culture and European norms. In our own country, parallel societies are forming in which minorities practice their medieval norms and undemocratic ways of thinking. We cannot accept that (Mikkelsen, 2005).

This attempted discursive link between 'cultural battle', confrontation with Muslim culture, and cultural assimilation backfired. The expert groups who had debated the *canon* refused such enlistment in a nationalist project and many commentators were wondering about the exact connection between reading Johannes V. Jensen (a brilliant Danish author – with fascist sympathies) and supporting democracy.¹²

2.3. Contesting membership: Parliamentary debates on the naturalisation law

Each year the Danish parliament debates a law containing long lists of names of prospective citizens, where, in the words of a former minister of integration, it is decided whether "a person meets the conditions which the parliament which passes the law, *believes should apply*" (Harder 2002, *italics added*). In recent years, these debates have become very elaborate. They are excellent indicators of the contested terms of belonging in Denmark, both in terms of what unites and divides the main political groupings. What follows is a concise exposition of the main positions.¹³

Parliament slowly began debating naturalisation conditions in the seventies. From the beginning, far right anti-immigrant parties took up more than half of the speech time in parliament sessions on the issue, thereby largely determining the terms of debates, with crime and numbers dominating (Holm 2004: 6). The late seventies saw a basic division between a very liberal left and a xenophobic far right. Suspicion of administrative intentions and procedures, the right wanted 'the people' (or its representatives) to be able to look into each application and decide. The left employed a dis-

¹² And some commentators wondered how many of the books the Minister, more fond of soccer than museums, had read himself.

¹³ The data material is based on a mixture of sources. Primary sources are news paper articles and some recent debates on radio and television. Secondary sources are qualitative analyses of parliamentary debates on citizenship and naturalization carried out by other scholars (Holm 2004; Jensen 2006).

course of formal equality, arguing that terms and conditions for Danish citizens and foreigners should be equal, and saw special treatments and too strict demands on foreigners as illegitimate. Citizenship was not on the parliament agenda until the late eighties when the right wing Progress Party (*Fremskridtspartiet*) again questioned foreign criminals' access to citizenship.

By then, the debate expanded to a more principled level. The perception by the extreme right was that the official Danish stance was one of 'goodness' and (naive) willingness to accommodate immigrants. They wanted "limits to goodness" (Holm 2004: 13) in order that a tolerant and generous welfare state could be maintained. Another line of argument focused on the new citizens' impact on the nation as an ethnic community, mixing (confusing) ethnos and demos: The balance between ethnic Danes and foreigners would be disturbed if too many foreigners were granted citizenship, one day possibly outnumbering the small Danish 'folk'.

During the nineties, echoing widespread public concern, a new debate on naturalisation came to revolve around the linkage between *integration* and citizenship. The dominant discourse tied naturalisation strictly to the achieved level of integration. This debate was still influenced by anti-immigrant parties (now the increasingly popular Danish People's Party) taking initiatives and colouring the parliament agenda with anti-immigrant fears of Denmark becoming a "multicultural or a multiethnic society" with growing numbers of "inassimilable" citizens. Growing general concern with problems of immigration, fed by the Danish People's Party and media campaigns¹⁴ provoked former Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen to state that "Denmark is not and will never become a multiethnic society" (cited in Togeby 1998).

'Integration' thus became point of departure for the discourse on naturalisation. In Denmark the former concept has always been close to 'assimilation' as commonly understood (Hamburger 1989). Definitions and policies entirely lack the component of adaptation on behalf of native Danes, and cultural preservation is given no significance. Significantly (Lex 2006), the first Danish Law on Integration spoke of the need for "mutual understanding and respect between immigrants and refugees" (Ministry of integration 1999). This, however, has been changed to a need (on the part of immigrants) for "understanding of the basic norms and values of the Danish society" (*ibid.* 2003). In a similar vein, naturalisation requirements, as laid out in parliament debates, increasingly presuppose (cultural) assimilation. Citizenship is more than rights and obligations, and naturalisation requires more than giving up one's old passport. It also entails getting a new identity.

Moreover, a tendency became visible to use Muslims as *the* defining 'other' of Danishness and Danish citizenship and to question if was all together possible for Muslims, with their authoritarian mentality, to integrate into Danish society:

When we speak of Denmark taking in people for permanent residence, I would say: yes, if they want to integrate themselves! But I don't know if the last honourable speaker will call it integration when the next generation wants reunification with a spouse from the home country. I will not call that

¹⁴ See also Morten Ejrnæs' analysis of the anti-immigrant campaign by the tabloid paper Ekstra Bladet and its consequences for the Law on Integration in 1999 (Ejrnæs 2001).

wanting to live in a Danish way, only wanting the advantages of Danish citizenship. [...] We should not interfere [in people's private affairs] ... But when women for generations are not allowed to learn Danish, it is fair to demand that they learn enough Danish to understand their rights in a country such as Denmark, so as not to continue being suppressed as slaves in their own homes by their husbands. That cannot be called integration into Danish society (Kirsten Madsen, 1994, quoted from Holm 2004).

Summing up, discourses on citizenship have not been very elaborate during the first decades of their development. The development in scope and depth has only increased significantly during the last decade. But since the seventies they have been of an 'ethnic assimilationist' or 'communitarian' type (Koopmans & Statham 2000: 20-22). Let us now look into recent developments up until and after the new 'Agreement on Citizenship' from 2005.

Government discourse: "Fair to demand something in return"

The discourse of the current government has two characteristics: A focus on the ethnic and national distinctiveness that is tied to citizenship, and a focus on citizenship as a reward which should incite foreigners to become integrated in order to obtain it. To the government the new approach to naturalisation should raise the respect for citizenship as a national marker while ensuring, more pragmatically, that foreigners make a conscious effort to *earn* citizenship. The latter element mixes a neo-liberal, economic logic (we want you if you can support yourself) with a neo-republican vision of citizenship, both of which have a strong element of *will*. The community should be potentially open "for who has made an active effort to become part of Danish society" (Hvilshøj, quoted in Folketingstidende 2005-06), with the repeated underlining that foreigners must strive to do so. The interests of Denmark come before those of the individual, and the concept of rights is tied to the concept of obligations. Thus, both Liberals and Conservatives are concerned to tie a number of *fair obligations* to citizenship – thus also adding to the value and symbolic distinctiveness of citizenship.

However, even though the government position distances itself from ethnic perception of citizenship in its most excluding form, the national and cultural elements again come in by the back door and play an increasingly important role in arguments. Civic equality is only possible, in the dominant view, if the community is limited in number (and relatively homogeneous) and the certain natural boundaries are set by the nation.

Citizenship has a great impact on the individual and his/her sense of belonging to the country he or she lives in. [...] Therefore, Danish citizenship and the special rights that are connected to it, must presuppose a certain sense of belonging to Danish society and loyalty towards Denmark (Hvilshøj, quoted from national radio, P1 Debat, 2007).

Exactly how far in terms of this "certain sense of belonging", over and above political loyalties (i.e. forms of constitutional patriotism), the government wishes to go, is unclear. The conservative and the liberal party, apart from depending on the Danish People's Party, also stand divided between 'modernists' and 'traditionalists' – including

proponents of a *Kulturkamp* already noted above – on the importance of national culture. However, a tendency is visible – generally in the discourse, but particularly acute in the debates on naturalisation - to articulate a ‘culturalised’ form of, as it were, Danish universalism. Here, liberal and conservative politicians fill the category of ‘Danish norms and values’ (by which applicants of citizenship must abide) with universal values, such as ‘open mindedness’ (*frisind*), equality, tolerance, and democracy. But at the same time they speak of these in a communitarian way, as inherent in Danish culture, as being ‘cultural’ in the sense of integrated in old, deep forms of life, characterising a Danish homogeneity and constituting the society’s cohesiveness (see, further Mouritsen 2006):

As a small peaceful country, where the people is homogenous and territorial and linguistic borders largely follow each other, we have special preconditions for influencing with our values. We have a rooted democracy, which is not only based on formal institutions and laws but which is a culture with the Danish people (Rasmussen 2003).

The Danish people have a good tradition of wanting to solve problems and taking things easy. We talk things over. Attitudes are expressed and decisions made across the table, drinking a cup of coffee. We can call it deliberative democracy. [...] In my opinion the Danish society can include several religions. We already do. But one condition must be met if this is to be combined with strong cohesion in Danish society: And this is that Islam, as any other religion, finds its place within the easygoing Danish deliberative democracy (Rasmussen 2005).

Thus, liberal values are associated with *thick* metaphors, whereby democracy, anti-authoritarian freedom of mind and egalitarianism become part and parcel of Danish *folkelighed*, rooted in Danish mentality and culture. These particular Danish ways of life and of holding liberal values must be learned by who wants to become a Danish citizen. The result – although research has yet to be carried out on how this is received and experienced by immigrants – is a quite exclusive construction of membership, even though it may appear at a glance not to be.

The Ethnic/Nationalist Discourse – ‘The True Meaning of Citizenship’

We turn now to a discourse which is less ambiguous on these matters. As noted already, the Danish People’s Party has had a very significant impact on the policies and debates on immigration, integration and citizenship in recent years. One MP, Søren Krarup – a priest and intellectual – has been particularly influential in what constitutes a re-interpretation of ‘the meaning of citizenship’ (*Indfødsrettens mening*, Krarup 2006b). With clear historical references to why ‘indfødsret’ (see definition of this particular term above, chapter 2.1.) came into the world in the first place, he has argued that:

Before anything else, ‘indfødsret’ is the protection of the nation: The children of the country shall enjoy the bread of the country, Guldberg [a conservative national politician] wrote in the introduction of the law on citizenship [of 1776], and in the epoch of Struense [German speaking chancellor, executed for conspiracy and adultery with the queen] this was not only necessary to underline,

but also an expression of national self defence. The introduction of the law on citizenship became the beginning of a national awakening" (Krarup, 2004).

According to this view, citizenship is the most important formal expression of national identity:

Is Denmark a nation, inhabited by a people, or is Denmark merely an inhabited area characterised by certain rules of conduct? [...] The Danish People's Party insists on the former. Therefore we have something called citizenship [indfødsret] and therefore it shall only be granted to those who belong to the Danish people (Krarup 2005a)

Belonging is according to this view *particular* and concrete, essential and unchangeable, and very much in opposition to a set of abstract principles of universal character. It is a *natural* consequence of descent, history, and culture, and organically achieved by native born members of the nation. In this perception the nation (and people), the land (territory), and the state are congruent. Ethnos and Demos are one, which is why naturalisation means assimilation to Danish culture and way of being. Citizenship exists as a marker of who belongs and who does not.

Citizenship, therefore, is *not* an instrument to better integration but an end in itself, and a gift to those who are worthy of it. It is definitely not a 'human' right to be granted on the same terms as to Danish natives.

The opposition – an inclusive conception of cohesion of society

Also the opposition speaks constantly of social cohesion. The left wing parties – Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti); The United List (Enhedslisten), and the social liberal party, The Radical left (Det Radikale Venstre) however are much more liberal on immigration, and their stand on citizenship's consequence for cohesion of society is the completely opposite of the government's stand:

The new agreement on citizenship is a bomb underneath the future cohesiveness of Danish society (Ammitzbøll, Radical Left, 2006).

Here, citizenship should *not* mark a difference between members and non-members. Rather it should be an instrument to mark or create fundamental equality between all inhabitants, foreigners as natives. This notion in fact *also* often refers, in a culturalising manner to particular Danish values. But it employs a different notion of Danishness, about the open-mindedness of a small nation in an increasingly global world. It refers to the "inclusive and inviting" side of Danish character, where "hospitality and open-mindedness (*frisind*) are pivotal Danish values" (Nielsen 2005). According to such reasoning, "the suggestion that new citizens must take a test in Danishness is a threat to Danish culture, to democracy, and to the liberal Denmark" (*ibid*). Citizenship should include, rather than exclude. Although citizenship must stop at the border, although the nation is Danish, and although Danishness equals liberal values, these equations can also be employed rhetorically to shame and criticism:

As a Dane I am raised in a tradition of freedom. In a country that praises cooperating democracy. In a country that wishes to help those in need of a helping

hand, whether it they be unemployed people in this country, or people in a third world country who hardly grow enough corn for their own needs. An open, freedom-loving, and open-minded country. And it was with pride in my voice that I sang *In Denmark I am born* [national hymn by Hans Christian Andersen] as a child. [...] But the borders for Danishness have narrowed. Danishness has become conform. Danishness has become more self-righteous and inward-looking (Ammitzbøll 2005a).

Some parts of the new agreement on citizenship were particularly controversial to the opposition. Previous victims of torture, suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, were exempted from the language test before, but this possibility is now removed with the agreement. Another controversy has been the deprivation of former criminals, with sentences of 18 months or more, of their possibility to apply for citizenship. Such restrictions, from this point of view, violate a kind of humanity, which is a Danish virtue. Here, new citizenship restrictions damage the cohesion of society because they increase the number of non-members. If the conception of belonging is still national, it differs from dominant perceptions by regarding inclusion as a national virtue and perceiving as members all individuals who live on Danish territory.

By dividing the people who live in this country into level A and B Danes we risk splitting up Danish society. Therefore, the new rules jeopardize the cohesion of society (Ammitzbøll 2005b).

Any room for cultural diversity in Danish citizenship?

This increased level of detail in the regulation of immigrants' life in Denmark in general and access to citizenship in particular reflects an urge on behalf of the government to make very explicit the attitudes, norms, and values to which foreigners must conform. The perceived normative consequences of universal rules become explicated and inserted in rules and regulations, marking an ever intensified attempt to control the integration process, forcing individuals to change and 'transform' the culture they bring with them, and adopt a more superior and modern (Danish) one. Although dominant public philosophies of citizenship are civic, they are civic in a culturalised way, and their manner of being disseminated and inculcated – with contracts, declarations, ceremonies and tests, looks like a modern form of assimilation (Hedetoft 2003), arguably typical of a universalistic welfare state, which is obsessed with homogenization as a precondition of its future success (Kymlicka and Banting 2006).

3. The Cartoon affair:

The publication of twelve vignettes of the prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* (JP) on 30 September 2005 caused a huge mobilization of Muslims in Denmark and around the world, which led to what is seen by many as the worst crisis in Danish foreign affairs since WW2. The background of the publication was a Danish debate about self-censorship vis-à-vis Islam in the public space, and the decision to publish the cartoons was justified by reference to such reported self-censorship. Most important in Denmark was the case of the writer, Kåre Bluitgen, who was reported unable to find anyone willing to illustrate his children's book on the life of the prophet. This story is by now well known as are further developments such as

the non-meeting between the Danish prime-minister and eleven Muslim ambassadors in Denmark, the delegation of Danish imams who travelled to the Middle East seeking support for their cause, and the later protests in the region manifested in flag burnings, embassy attacks and boycotts of Danish products.

Less known is how this chain of events, now known as the 'Muhammad controversy', 'the cartoon affair' or 'the Jyllands-posten crisis', depending on the perspective of the observer, has shaped the responses and strategies of claims-making among different involved actors inside Denmark. This section of the report aims provides an empirical outline of the Danish origins and development of the later global "Cartoon affair". In doing so, it first discusses the Danish background of the controversy, and the possible as well as stated reasons for publication of the cartoons given by JP. Secondly, it offers an outline of the trajectory of the Danish part of the controversy, presenting central actors and events. Thirdly, and in line with the overall emphasis of this report on the level of general discourse, it analyses the content of claims in the Danish debate, focusing on developments in *issues* debated, *justifications* used and the envisioned *solutions* to the conflict. Fourthly, it scrutinizes the massive Muslim mobilization in Denmark in response to the cartoons, looking at the diverse dynamics of mobilization and de-mobilization. Finally, it offers some conjectures as to the questions of 'why Denmark' and 'why now'.

3.1. The background

To make sense of the Danish origins and dynamics of the cartoons affair setting, some facts must be in place: *Jyllands-Posten* is the largest Danish daily, and main supporting voice of the present government, a minority coalition of the *Conservatives* and *The Liberal Party*, with the *Danish People's Party* providing the necessary additional votes to secure majority. The Muslim population in Denmark totals around 190.000 or ca. 3,5% of population, the largest groups being labour immigrants and with descendents from Turkey and Pakistan, and refugees from Iraq, Somalia, Iran, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Lebanon (Østergaard 2006: 18).

In the article that accompanied the twelve cartoons in JP, cultural editor, Flemming Rose, wrote:

The modern secular society is dismissed by some Muslims. They demand special treatment when they insist on special consideration of their own religious feelings. This is incompatible with secular democracy and freedom of speech, where one should be ready to stand scorn, mockery and ridicule...[...]...This is why Jyllands-Posten has invited members of the Danish Newspaper Illustrators Association to draw Muhammad as they see him

The stated motive for launching the project of the Muhammad cartoons by JP was, thus, in a context of observed self-censorship, to teach Danish Muslims to stand ridicule of religious beliefs and feelings in the name of secularism. However, the motives of JP soon became an issue in its own right. Many observers, among them most Danish Muslim actors, argued that self-censorship and free speech were mere cover ups for the real intentions of the paper, which was a deliberate provocation of Danish Muslims in order to test their reactions. The publication of the cartoons, in this perspec-

tive, was a 'visualization' of the harsh tone of debate on Muslims and integration in Denmark over the last two decades and the stand of JP in particular. Where JP put cited self-censorship as legitimizing their actions many Danish Muslims pointed out, correctly, that Danish debate on Muslim practices has been characterised by very few restrictions on what can be publicly uttered about Islam and Muslims. This trend was exemplified recently, it was said, by e.g. the Minister of Culture, Brian Mikkelsen's, declaration of war against 'middle age' norms and values among Danish Muslims (cited above), MP Louise Frevert's (DPP) comparison of Muslims with cancer cells, and the radical right radio station, *Radio Holger's*, public incitement to violence against Muslims. Legally, the free tone of debate is underpinned by comparatively weak hate speech laws (*Radio Holger* was convicted, while Frevert was not), and a blasphemy law which has not been used since the 1930's. However, free speech was also prior to the cartoons affair part of the Danish 'kulturkamp'. Thus, an important as background of the affair is the broadcasting of Ayann Hirsi Ali's film *Submission* on Danish public service television and the later presentation, to Ali, of the *Liberal Party's* 'freedom prize' by the Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in 2004.

Thus, prior to the cartoons central members of the government had invested time and prestige in a critique of certain Muslim norms and sensitivities. Adding to this the government's political dependency on the *Danish People's Party* and the fact that the cartoons coincided with local election campaigns in Denmark, we begin to understand the government's initial (mis)treatment of the affair. Arguably, it would have been politically very unwise for the government to accommodate Muslim claims and protests that followed the publication. Thus, the prime minister chose a position where he continuously declared that he could and would not interfere with affairs of the free press, but that anybody was free to have a specific case tried by the courts appealing to existing laws limiting free speech. In this interpretation, Fogh Rasmussen's position implied that it was impossible for him to even comment on the cartoons. This answer was used to justify turning down the request for a meeting from the Muslim ambassadors in early October 2005, and the same answer was given to OIC and the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs on their requests in the following weeks.

3.2. The Cartoon affair as an episode of contentious politics

It is important to relate the cartoon affair to its Danish origin and context. However, it also makes sense to view the affair as an episode of contentious politics, that is, a series of events and public collective interactions among makers of claims over a limited period of time (McAdam and et al. 2001: 7-8). By applying this perspective to the affair we assume that a number of processes and mechanisms common to other types of contentious politics, such as certain dynamics of mobilization, boundary activation, polarization, and claims-making are also at play in this controversy. We return in detail to some of these dynamics in the subsequent paragraphs.

That the cartoon affair in a Danish context (and elsewhere) was episodic is confirmed by data on the overall news coverage of the cartoons in Denmark. Figure 1 depicts the development in the amount of news items related to the cartoons from the publication in late September 2005 and one year onwards:

(Figure 1 about here)

Figure 1 shows how news coverage, and indirectly public debate, on the cartoons was rather limited in the first three months after the publication, but then exploded in late January 2006, culminating in February and March, and fading from April onwards (with a small resurrection around the one year 'anniversary'). However, figure 1 also says something about the intensity and persistence of the debate. This picture is confirmed if we look at actual claims-making in the debate. A claim is here defined as the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action in the public sphere.¹⁵ Figure 2 depicts the overall development in total claims-making regarding the cartoons by collective actors in Denmark from the publication to the beginning demobilization of the issue in April 2006:

(Figure 2 about here)

Figure 2 shows how collective claims-making around the cartoons sharply increases in the last two weeks of January 2006 and culminates in the first two weeks of February.

Who were these collective actors engaged in claims-making around the cartoons in Denmark? Figure 3 shows the share of total claims by groups of actors, and the different actor's average position vis-à-vis Danish Muslims and their demands pertaining to the cartoons:

(Figure 3 about here)

Looking at shares of total claims in the public debate we see that Muslim actors were by far the dominant claimants (22,7%), not surprisingly as the issue was of concern to almost any Muslim. The Danish government, which together with JP was the main addressee of Muslim claims, take up 13% of total claims, followed by scientific institutions and individual scholars (11,3%) (who commented upon and analysed the situation), the legislative branch – basically the opposition (9,4%) and journalists and media including JP (7,6%), who in this case were both a platform of debate and central stakeholders. The relatively large shares of claims represented by artists and artistic organisations (6,6%) reflects involvement by a number of writers and illustrators (most noticeable Danish PEN), while the significant presence of firms and employers organisations (6,6%) has to do with the boycott of Danish products in the Middle East from late January 2006.

If we then look at the average positions of these main actors towards Muslim claims to have some kind of apology or, at least, recognition of hurt religious feelings, we see the contours of the 'constellation of enemies and allies' in the Danish debate on the cartoons. On the side of the Muslims we see a coalition which, beside the obvious solidarity organisations, counts weighty Danish business people and organisations, impor-

¹⁵ The following builds on a "claims analysis", inspired by Koopmans and Statham 1999; Koopmans 2002, of all claims pertaining to the cartoons in the Danish daily, *Berlingske Tidende*, from the publication of the cartoons to the end of March 2006. The choice of *Berlingske Tidende* is based on an assumption that the paper's coverage of the controversy is more balanced than any other of the large Danish dailies. The database also includes codings of other material (web-sites, pamphlets, organisational documents etc.) containing claims referring to the cartoons from identified Danish Muslim actors.

tant artists and academic scholars, Christian clerics and parts of the political opposition. Besides, this pro-Muslim coalition included the large daily newspaper, *Politiken* and influential public intellectuals, most noticeably the ex-Minister and leader of the *Liberal Party*, Uffe Elleman Jensen. On the side of JP and the government were, besides marginal radical right actors, most media actors, journalists and a large range of public intellectuals and commentators. The 'political parties' category largely represents interventions by the *Danish People's Party*.

3.3. The Content of claims: Issues and arguments in the Cartoon debate

In the Danish debate that followed the cartoons an intense discursive battle developed on how to frame the affair, on defining what the affair was 'a case of'. If we look at the thematic issues touched upon in claims made by Danish actors in the controversy (displayed over time in figure 5 below) we sense how this is by no means obvious:

(Figure 5 about here)

Figure 5 indicates that the debate was multifaceted, and that no consensus existed on what exactly was at stake. Yet, some issues were more salient and robust than others of the debate over time. Interestingly in a Danish context, the affair was most frequently framed with reference to Muslim handling of the conflict (violent protests, boycott, imam-delegations etc.), and only subsequent as a case of freedom of speech. Other central issues include the government's handling of the crisis, conflict resolution, and the affair framed in terms of discrimination, tolerance/respect and integration. The most striking developments over time are how the affair in the beginning (October – November 2005) is successfully (from the point of JP and the Danish government) framed in terms of freedom of speech (self-censorship), while from December through February it largely became an issue of Muslim (mis)handling of the situation. This issue shift can be explained by 'conjuncture-related events' abroad, such as the boycott, the attacks on embassies and the actions of the imam-delegations, which changed the focus of the debate. It is also worth noticing how, from late February through March, the cartoon affair, to some extent, becomes re-interpreted within the larger debate on (Muslim) integration and belonging in Denmark.

Looking into the specific content of claims, i.e. the 'prognostic frames or formulations of what should be done, we see no consensus among Danish actors on how to resolve the crisis. The most frequently called for solution was different forms of intensified dialogue in order to bring about more respect and tolerance between Muslims and non-Muslims (10% of all prognostic frames, N=391), followed by demands on the government to have the meeting with the Muslim ambassadors (6,1%) and calls for an apology on behalf of JP (4,1%). The demand for an apology from JP (mainly from Danish Muslims), together with the call for a diplomatic meeting, is dominant in the first months of the controversy, while the dialogue perspective becomes salient as the conflict intensifies from January 2006 onwards. It seems that the 'dialogue card' becomes increasingly important to many actors as the controversy turns international, and as easy fix solutions to the conflict become more difficult to imagine.

More interesting maybe is how these different solutions were justified in the debate – what discourses were activated in order to legitimate claims. Here I will just look at Danish Muslim justifications.

(Figure 6 about here)

Figure 6 shows the distribution of Muslim framing of claims by groups of justifying arguments within two types of arenas: The public sphere (the newspaper *Berlingske Tidende*) and the internal semi-public sphere of Muslim organisations (ex. websites, news lists, Friday sermons etc.). The most frequently used justification by Muslim actors in the larger public sphere is that of 'injustice/victimage' (35%), e.g. references to how the cartoons were deliberately intended to harm, how the cartoons were the 'straw that broke the camels back' for Danish Muslims, and generally how the latter are a weak and marginalized minority. Within the semi-public sphere of Muslim organisations the main source of legitimacy of claims is religious discourse (36,3%), including citation of Koran and *hadiths*, references to Muhammad's status as global icon/role-model, and general references to the sacredness of the prophets of Islam. However, this religiously charged argumentation is also significant to Muslim claims-making in the public sphere at large (33,3%). Another central group of frames, in both arenas, are the right-based justifications, which include references to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, anti-discrimination rights, human rights etc. What does this tell us? We see that Danish Muslims during the cartoon affair, rightfully or not, re-activates a discourse of 'victimage' which have been used on other occasions (Necsef 2003). Also visible is a tendency that Danish Muslims who enter the public secular sphere play down religious arguments – they adjust to the principles of 'rational' argument in this arena. In particular, Danish Muslims to a large degree are able to 'translate' their religiously based despair to a secular discourse of rights and duties.

These different issues, prognostic and justificational frames seem to be bundled together in certain main interpretive 'packages' (Gamson and Modigliani 1995), with sponsors or exponents in the debate. By cross-tabulating these discursive variables four main packages can be identified – here presented in an ideal typical manner:

1) 'Freedom of speech and secularism': We have in Denmark, as in other democratic societies, a right to comment critically on everything of a public interest. It is a fundamental right and value in our society and includes the right to questioning religious authorities and beliefs. Without criticism of religious dogma our society will stagnate economically, materially, culturally and scientifically. Besides, we have in Denmark a long tradition of using political caricatures as part of public debate, and occasionally hurt feelings is just something people have to accept. When freedom of speech is under attack with threats and violence we must stand firm. There are no 'buts' when dealing with freedom of speech. If we start bending the principle of freedom of speech we enter a slippery slope and we will slowly erode the basis of democracy.

2) 'The West vs. Islam': We are in the midst of a value clash or 'clash of civilizations' with Islamism – a clash that is comparable to the fight against other totalitarian belief systems like Nazism, fascism and communism. Confrontations between the West and Islam are unavoidable and people who

believe anything else, are naïve (just look at the veil debate, the Rushdie affair, Van Gogh, 9/11 etc.). The cartoon crisis is just one of many value clashes, and the reactions of fundamentalist Muslims and Imams show exactly why we must stand firm and use all available means in the fight against Islamism and backward thinking.

3) 'Failed integration and discrimination': Muslims in Europe and Denmark in particular, are victims of growing discrimination and islamophobic tendencies. Decades of failed integration policies and an increasingly harsh tone towards minorities have placed Muslims at the margins of society, and thus as easy victims of discrimination and scape-goating. The radical right is exploiting public fear of 'difference' and 'parallel societies', and is constantly pushing the limits of what can be said publicly about Islam and Muslims. The cartoons and the reactions of Muslims can only be understood in this context. Thus, the drawings were yet another deliberative provocation of an already marginalised and vulnerable minority - the straw that broke the camels back for Danish Muslims. There is an urgent need for changing the tone of debate over Islam, and for improving conditions for Muslim integration and equality.

4) 'Public virtue': Freedom of speech is a fundamental value, but so is protection of minorities, tolerance and respect of difference. Freedom of speech has limits and needs to be balanced against other values and rights, including freedom of religion and the right to absence of discrimination and prosecution. A right to speak is not the same as an obligation to speak – there are things we do not have to say out of common decency and respect of others' feelings. Denmark is today a multicultural society in a global world, where different cultures and religions have to live side by side. This is not achieved by mocking others, but through dialogue, openness and fostering of mutual respect. The cartoons should have been avoided – not because they should not have been covered by freedom of speech, but because they were pointless attempts to provoke and hurt.

These interpretative packages compete about lending meaning to the controversy and their respective volume and impact varies with time.

3.4. Muslim mobilization/de-mobilization in Denmark

Several types of Danish Muslim actors were involved in claims-making during the Muhammad caricatures controversy. We can distinguish five types: 1) *Islamic organisations*, which refers to formal organisations or congregations, who are involved in the institutionalization of Islam as a religion vis-à-vis the majority society, and/or running community centres or mosques, 2) *Muslim protest coalition*, which refers to an ad hoc coalition of pre-existing Islamic organisations, who joined forces in protesting the cartoons, 3) *Muslim religious authorities*, which refers to individual imams and other Islamic scholars, who often play key roles in Islamic organisations, and in the established protest coalition, 4) *'ambassadors of Islam'*, which refers to individual Muslims, who possess a certain respect/influence in (parts of) the Muslim community and in majority society, because of merits of a non-religious kind, ex. prominent businessmen,

artists, athletes, politicians, integration-consultants etc., and 5) *Muslims as unorganised collective*, which basically refers to instances where informal gatherings of Muslims raise collective claims, i.e. demonstrations or marches.

The first wave of mobilization: Mobilization through pre-existing religious resources

Figure 7 below shows the development of the share of the total amount of Muslim claims by these different types of actors. Islamic organisations are by far the dominating actors (50%), followed by Muslim religious authorities (24,3%) and the Muslim protest coalition (12,4%). Considering that the Muslim protest coalition also consists of established Islamic organisations, we realize that formal Islamic organisations played a key role in mobilising Danish Muslims and protesting the cartoons. Thus, mobilization of Danish Muslims during the controversy to a large degree is founded upon 'appropriation' of pre-existing organisations as vehicles of claims-making and arenas of 'block mobilization' (McAdam 1982). Responding to the imposed grievances Danish Muslims take advantage of existing communicative channels, material resources, hierarchy of authority, congregated participants etc.

(Figure 7 about here)

However, in order to understand how this appropriation of individual Islamic organisations took place and how the overarching protest coalition came into existence, we must turn to a different type of Muslim actors – the religious authorities. The creation of the protest coalition is illustrative. All ready on 2 October 2005 (two days after publication) a meeting was held at the premises of *Islamisk Trossamfund* in Copenhagen on the initiative of the two imams of the Grimhøjvej-mosque in Århus, Raed Hlayhel and Ahmed Akkari. Here it was decided that something should be done, and a *Committee for Honouring the Prophet (SAW)*, was created with imam Raed Hlayhel as chairman, and Imam Ahmed Akkari as spokesperson. This committee of religious authorities became the foundation upon which the Muslim protest coalition was built. Throughout the controversy it was the core representation of the coalition and its steering committee. That the coalition was successful in raising claims is seen by figure 7. The initial protest in the first month after the publication was largely dominated by the Muslim protest coalition (42,9%) and its leading imams. As the controversy unfolded the importance of the coalition diminished significantly, while individual Islamic organisations and religious authorities took over from December and onwards. This indicates that the protest coalition, and more precisely its religiously led steering committee, played the role of mobilization initiators and issue diffusers, paving the way for other Islamic organisations and authorities. However, the data also indicates that Danish Muslims failed to establish an effective protest coalition, which including the majority of Muslim actors. As the controversy intensified and more Muslim actors entered the stage, they did so with individual voices.

The second wave of mobilization: mobilization through opposition

As shown above, the mobilization of Danish Muslims in the controversy is to a large degree a product of social appropriation of pre-existing Islamic organisations and resources, especially through activation of religious discourse by established religious

authorities. This picture is further validated by figure 8 which shows the development of shares in total Muslim claims by central Islamic organisations.

(figure 8 about here)

However, Figure 8 also shows that this first wave of Muslim mobilization by February is losing strength, and is taken over by a second wave, which sees the entrance on the stage by new actors and an upgraded activity level by others. The second wave of mobilization coincides with the overall intensification of the controversy in late January and early February 2006 (see also Figure 2). Most noticeable is the entrance of *Demokratiske Muslimer*, officially created with a first general meeting on February 4, on the initiative of MP Naser Khader. After some interventions by Naser Khader in the name of the forming 'new network' (at the time called *Moderate Muslimer*) in December and January, *Demokratiske Muslimer* burst into the debate representing 18% of the total Muslim claims in February and no less than 26,1% in March. What we see is that claims-making of the two most dominant Muslim actors from the first wave of mobilization, *Islamisk Trossamfund* and the *Muslim protest coalition*, suddenly drops sharply from February onwards, leaving room for new and other Muslim actors.

The new Muslim actors of the second wave, predominantly *Demokratiske Muslimer*, were a direct reaction to the imam-led responses during the first wave of mobilization. Thus, *Demokratiske Muslimer* was launched as a 'second' or 'alternative' voice to the imams in the debate – a sort of counter-mobilization. The first wave of Muslim mobilization in the controversy was, largely, a product of imposed grievances from the surrounding society, which was turned into religious motivations by Muslim religious authorities. The second wave of mobilization was fuelled by a felt 'misrepresentation' by many Danish Muslims, who disapproved of the actions and arguments of the imams. Thus, it was primarily a reaction to grievances imposed by other Danish Muslims, and not to the cartoons as such. This feeling of misrepresentation was mobilised upon by people like Naser Khader and Tanwir Ahmed (*The Network*), who utilised pre-existing personal networks (as did the imams), to create and position new 'voices' in the debate. Where the imams could draw upon religious authority in fertilizing protest, these secular Muslims leaders drew upon existing social status, recognition and resources such as contacts to the political establishment.

Without going into detail, it seems that the decline of the first wave of Muslim mobilization in Denmark and the rise of the second have to do with important conjunctural events abroad. The imam-led protest drive of the first wave ran into trouble after the delegations to the Middle East in December 2005. Through mechanisms of certification/decertification and changed actor attributions of opportunity/threat this conjunctural event, and the following violent attacks on Danish interests in the Middle East, led to a 'radical flank effect' (Herbert 1984), which forced central actors of the first wave into the defensive, paving the way for the second wave.

3.5. Why Denmark? Why now?

The New York Times wrote about the cartoon affair in January 2006 that Denmark has become the "unlikely front in Islam-West culture war" – unlikely, because of the country's size, small Muslim minority, and relatively short history of immigration. However,

if one looks a bit closer at recent political developments in Denmark, rather than “unlikely” it seems quite logical that Denmark was the seedbed of the affair. For two decades the Muslim population in Denmark has been at the centre of intense public debate over the terms of integration, multiculturalism and citizenship – as discussed in section 2. On a policy level Denmark has moved from being one of the more liberal immigration countries in Europe to being the country with, probably, the toughest immigration/asylum-laws, and with strongly conditioned integration policies (for details see section 2). On a more ideational level a sense of (civic) nationalism has swept the country boosting the political impact of the *Danish People’s Party*, and scepticism of multiculturalism and political correctness has been growing. In this process free speech issues, or the much talked about ‘tone of the integration debate’, have been a central catalyst. Thus, many view the publication of cartoons as a natural extension of the public debate on Muslim integration – a visualisation of an already existing political climate. This is why the cartoons occurred in Denmark and not, say, in neighbouring Sweden. Besides, as indicated initially in this section, the particular political dynamics surrounding the publication helps explain why the conflict was not quickly resolved or hosed down by the Danish government. Had the drawings occurred in Sweden the outcome seems likely to have been different, i.e. due to established and centralized channels of contact between Muslim representatives and the political elite, which are absent in a Danish context.

The framing of the cartoons as a culmination of a continued critical debate on Muslim integration in Denmark might help explain the affair’s Danish origin. However, this argument is insufficient as an explanation of why now – of why exactly the cartoons led to massive mobilization of Muslims in Denmark, and later to a global crisis. These somewhat deterministic ideas of pressure building and necessary pressure release in the shape of Muslim protests and claims-making, fails to explain how the cartoons are different from other recent severe attacks on Muslims in Denmark. Without going into detail two seemingly important factors should here be mentioned. First, by publishing cartoons, or rather *caricatures* of exactly the *prophet Muhammad*, *Jyllands-Posten* touched a collective nerve among the Muslim community, the sole uniting force among all (Danish) Muslims. Collective Muslim mobilization to some extent was built into the nature of the grievance imposed as an attack on the sacredness of the prophet Muhammad. The partial taboo of depictions of the prophet facilitated an ‘object shift’ so that the issue could be seen as an attack on all Muslims. Secondly, the identity of the sender of the message – *Jyllands-Posten* - seems to matter. The fact that the cartoons appeared in serious newspaper rather than on some web-page or through some marginal radical right media outlet, certainly made a difference. Thus, where the origins and initial non-Muslim reactions to the cartoons might be tied to features of the political context in Denmark, timing of the crisis and Danish Muslim’s reactions are rather tied to the nature of the message-sender constellation.

4. Conclusion: Civic perfectionism, fundamentalist liberalism, and good and bad Muslims

This report has examined two cases of public controversy on cultural diversity in Denmark. By way of conclusion a few remarks, which take us back to some of the themes of the introduction, must suffice. Each of the cases demonstrates important

elements of Danish national self-understandings and associated conceptions of diversity outlined there.

In particular each case testifies to a Danish civic perfectionism, or the existence of an ideology of requisite civic virtues, which must be learned, if one wishes to 'function' in Danish society. The new citizenship discourse, with its emphases on activity and the concomitant use in policy and naturalisation procedure of contracts, mandatory declarations and tests indicate an ever increasing ambition to mould and form citizens in numerous ways, also when this requires the use of tough assimilatory pressures. While these are official government initiatives, the publishing of the cartoon and the ensuing debates and conflicts were primarily based among civil society actors. Here, Jyllands-Posten and its supporters – which, at this level, eventually turned out to be the Government¹⁶ may be seen to be making a very principled point regarding a subset of these required virtues.

If indeed the object of the publication was to provoke Muslims, the idea (and the paper argued this) was that people who take their religion overly seriously and believe in an un-modern, doctrinaire manner, which is evidence of civic dependency and authoritarian outlooks (Muslims, by general agreement in Denmark and certainly among readers of Jyllands-Posten, fit this bill) "must be ready to stand scorn, mockery and ridicule". And if they do not stand it they might have to be taught – incidentally the newspaper concluded that *ordinary Danish* Muslims, unlike those in the Middle East and most of the imams, *were* ready to take it (they did not burn down embassies or invade Jyllands-Posten's offices)¹⁷. Hence, "provoking, offending, and making fun of religion ... can be construed as laudable attempts to liberate, i.e., to help (or force) individuals into modernity" (Mouritsen & Olsen 2006: 15).

The understanding of religion in evidence here is a form of fundamentalist liberalism as exemplified by the Prime Minister's (and numerous other politicians', including social democrats') insistence that "freedom of speech is absolute" and "not negotiable". This liberal absolutism is *not* rendered any less pronounced when such values (other candidates in a Danish context include equality between the sexes, 'conversational' democracy, and 'the separation of religion and politics') are presented as part and parcel of a national culture in manners, which are discussed in this report and elsewhere (Mouritsen 2007). Indeed, such culturalisation somehow adds to the sacredness of this later day 'constitutional patriotism' (Müller, forthcoming), in ways that tend to exclude rather than include newcomers of Muslim faith.

¹⁶ In his 2005/6 new year's speech the prime minister made points, which, read in conjunction with the cartoons, sound like full scale support (Rasmussen 2006):

"In Denmark, we have a healthy tradition of putting critical questions to authorities, be they of a political or religious nature. We use humour. We use satire. Our approach to authorities is actually rather relaxed. And to put it bluntly: it is this unorthodox approach to authorities; it is this urge to question the established order; it is this inclination to subject everything to critical debate that has led to progress in our society ... That is why freedom of speech is so vital. And freedom of speech is absolute. It is not negotiable"

¹⁷ One of the authors (Mouritsen) recently experienced the paper's perspective first hand with a group of international journalism students, including some Muslims. The official spokesman, who still had things to learn about public relations, began the session with a five minute pep-talk, which included such expressions as 'the vicious imams', 'good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims'.

Both the cases discussed testify to the construction of religion – fundamentalist or just seriously held – as opposed to these civic virtues and liberal values. The option which remains for Muslims in Denmark, which was taken up by the ‘Democratic Muslims’,¹⁸ is to present themselves as Muslims ‘in a Danish way’, i.e. as critical, reflective, individualist Muslims, or even as citizens who just happen to come from Muslim countries but do not necessarily take their religion very seriously. Good Muslims practice their religion, if they do so at all, in a protestant way, separating their religion from their identity as citizens. This construction of the religion-politics distinction, of course, is potentially unstable in a country which has a state church. While some liberals and conservatives continue to argue along the lines that ‘freedom of religion does not entail equality of religion’, and emphasise the connection between Danish Lutheranism and liberalism (indeed, its connection, in a peculiar way, to the mutual self-delineations of church and state, private-religious and secular-political spheres (Mouritsen 2006: 79-80), others begin to question the status of the *Danish People’s Church*. When the prime minister now argues (Rasmussen 2007) that “we should have less religion in public space”, “should regard each other as citizens and humans rather than as Christians, Jews, Muslims or Hindues”, that religion should be dismissed “as a criterion of how to organise public institutions” and that “our legislation should be neutral”, this may eventually spell the death of a privileged Lutheranism (even though he did not speak of the Christian church, but recent suggestions by a local city council on the integration of Muslim faith in local schools). Whether this take on religious diversity in Denmark is good news for practicing Muslims is another matter.

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¹⁸ The group was previously called the ‘Moderate Muslims’. Other Muslim groups include ‘Critical Muslims’ and ‘Muslims in Dialogue’ – all prefixes that indicate that ‘Muslims’ in and by themselves have an image problem in Denmark.

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Appendix:

Figure 1: Development in Number of Articles Attaining to the Controversy (all newspapers in *Infomedia*)

| Month | Count | Pct. |
|--------------|-------|-------|
| October 2005 | 446 | 2,2% |
| November | 278 | 1,4% |
| December | 682 | 3,4% |
| January 2006 | 1663 | 8,5% |
| February | 8481 | 42,9% |
| March | 3703 | 18,7% |
| April | 1106 | 5,6% |
| May | 858 | 4,3% |
| June | 843 | 4,2% |
| July | 446 | 2,2% |
| August | 365 | 1,8% |
| September | 960 | 4,8% |
| TOTAL | 19831 | 100% |

Figure 2: Total Amount of Claims by Week after the Publication of the Cartoons (Berlingske Tidende)




Figure 3: Groups of Actors in the Controversy: Percentage Share of Total Claims (*Berlingske Tidende* only) and Average Position vis-à-vis Muslim Claims

| | Share of Total Claims % | Average Position* |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Radical right | 0,9 | -1,00 |
| Commentators/public intellectuals | 6,3 | -0,43 |
| Media and journalists | 7,6 | -0,38 |
| Political parties | 3,2 | -0,19 |
| Other | 1,4 | -0,14 |
| Government | 13,0 | -0,05 |
| Legislative | 9,4 | 0,09 |
| Scientific institutions and reps. | 11,3 | 0,09 |
| Artists and artistic organisations | 6,6 | 0,13 |
| Judiciary | 1,1 | 0,14 |
| Churches | 2,8 | 0,22 |
| Employers organisations and firms | 6,6 | 0,29 |
| State departments/agencies | 4,3 | 0,37 |
| Professional organisations | 0,8 | 0,40 |
| General welfare, human rights orgs. | 1,2 | 0,67 |
| Ethnic minority and solidarity orgs. | 0,8 | 0,81 |
| Muslim Actors | 22,7 | - |

Total/overall average

100,0

0,06

N=

648

* -1=Anti-Muslim; 1=Pro-Muslim; 0=neither pro- nor anti-Muslim

Figure 4: Issues Debated Attaining to the Cartoons by Month

| ISSUE | | MONTH | | | | | | Total |
|---|----------------|---------|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------|--------|
| | | October | November | December | January | February | March | |
| FREEDOM OF SPEECH (FREEDOM OF RELIGION) | Count | 17 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 52 | 23 | 116 |
| | % within ISSUE | 14,7% | 4,3% | 6,0% | 10,3% | 44,8% | 19,8% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 24,3% | 26,3% | 10,8% | 8,5% | 13,7% | 16,0% | 14,2% |
| EQUALITY/PARITY | Count | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 27 |
| | % within ISSUE | 7,4% | 7,4% | 7,4% | 18,5% | 37,0% | 22,2% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 2,9% | 10,5% | 3,1% | 3,5% | 2,6% | 4,2% | 3,3% |
| DISCRIMINATION | Count | 10 | 0 | 12 | 13 | 19 | 10 | 64 |
| | % within ISSUE | 15,6% | ,0% | 18,8% | 20,3% | 29,7% | 15,6% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 14,3% | ,0% | 18,5% | 9,2% | 5,0% | 6,9% | 7,8% |
| TOLERANCE/RESPECT | Count | 6 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 24 | 6 | 50 |
| | % within ISSUE | 12,0% | 6,0% | 12,0% | 10,0% | 48,0% | 12,0% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 8,6% | 15,8% | 9,2% | 3,5% | 6,3% | 4,2% | 6,1% |
| INTEGRATION | Count | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 34 | 18 | 58 |
| | % within ISSUE | ,0% | 1,7% | 1,7% | 6,9% | 58,6% | 31,0% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | ,0% | 5,3% | 1,5% | 2,8% | 8,9% | 12,5% | 7,1% |
| GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF CONFLICT | Count | 14 | 1 | 13 | 14 | 37 | 22 | 101 |
| | % within ISSUE | 13,9% | 1,0% | 12,9% | 13,9% | 36,6% | 21,8% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 20,0% | 5,3% | 20,0% | 9,9% | 9,7% | 15,3% | 12,3% |
| MUSLIM HANDLING OF CONFLICT | Count | 3 | 1 | 14 | 43 | 80 | 13 | 154 |
| | % within ISSUE | 1,9% | ,6% | 9,1% | 27,9% | 51,9% | 8,4% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 4,3% | 5,3% | 21,5% | 30,5% | 21,1% | 9,0% | 18,8% |
| MEDIA | Count | 4 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 17 | 2 | 34 |
| | % within ISSUE | 11,8% | 5,9% | ,0% | 26,5% | 50,0% | 5,9% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 5,7% | 10,5% | ,0% | 6,4% | 4,5% | 1,4% | 4,2% |
| CONFLICT RESOLUTION/ PREVENTION | Count | 7 | 1 | 8 | 22 | 48 | 15 | 101 |
| | % within ISSUE | 6,9% | 1,0% | 7,9% | 21,8% | 47,5% | 14,9% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 10,0% | 5,3% | 12,3% | 15,6% | 12,6% | 10,4% | 12,3% |
| ISLAM AS A RELIGION | Count | 0 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 12 | 14 | 38 |
| | % within ISSUE | ,0% | 7,9% | 5,3% | 18,4% | 31,6% | 36,8% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | ,0% | 15,8% | 3,1% | 5,0% | 3,2% | 9,7% | 4,6% |
| VIOLENCE | Count | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 9 | 31 |
| | % within ISSUE | 12,9% | ,0% | ,0% | 12,9% | 45,2% | 29,0% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 5,7% | ,0% | ,0% | 2,8% | 3,7% | 6,3% | 3,8% |
| OTHER ISSUES | Count | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 12 |
| | % within ISSUE | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 8,3% | 83,3% | 8,3% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,7% | 2,6% | ,7% | 1,5% |
| GLOBALIZATION | Count | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 14 | 4 | 19 |
| | % within ISSUE | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 5,3% | 73,7% | 21,1% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | ,7% | 3,7% | 2,8% | 2,3% |
| SECULARISM | Count | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 14 |
| | % within ISSUE | 21,4% | ,0% | ,0% | 7,1% | 64,3% | 7,1% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 4,3% | ,0% | ,0% | ,7% | 2,4% | ,7% | 1,7% |
| Total | Count | 70 | 19 | 65 | 141 | 380 | 144 | 819 |
| | % within ISSUE | 8,5% | 2,3% | 7,9% | 17,2% | 46,4% | 17,6% | 100,0% |
| | % within MONTH | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Figure 5: Muslim Justificational Framing of Claims

| | | | Muslim Claims in | | Total |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| | | | Berlingske Tidende | Organisational Material | |
| Justification | Injustice/victimage | Count | 21 | 29 | 50 |
| | | % within JUSTIC | 42,0% | 58,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MUS CLAIM | 35,0% | 25,7% | 28,9% |
| | Rights-based justification | Count | 7 | 25 | 32 |
| | | % within JUSTIC | 21,9% | 78,1% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MUS CLAIM | 11,7% | 22,1% | 18,5% |
| | Religious justification | Count | 20 | 41 | 61 |
| | | % within JUSTIC | 32,8% | 67,2% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MUS CLAIM | 33,3% | 36,3% | 35,3% |
| | Cultural justification | Count | 4 | 3 | 7 |
| | | % within JUSTIC | 57,1% | 42,9% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MUS CLAIM | 6,7% | 2,7% | 4,0% |
| | Historical/traditional justification | Count | 0 | 8 | 8 |
| | | % within JUSTIC | ,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MUS CLAIM | ,0% | 7,1% | 4,6% |
| | Justification by (future) effects | Count | 7 | 4 | 11 |
| | | % within JUSTIC | 63,6% | 36,4% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MUS CLAIM | 11,7% | 3,5% | 6,4% |
| | Moral/ethical justification | Count | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| | | % within JUSTIC | 25,0% | 75,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MUS CLAIM | 1,7% | 2,7% | 2,3% |
| Total | Count | 60 | 113 | 173 | |
| | % within JUSTIC | 34,7% | 65,3% | 100,0% | |
| | % within MUS CLAIM | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | |

Figure 6: Share of Total Muslim Claims by Different Types of Muslim Actors over Time

| | | Month | | | | | | Total | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | October | November | December | January | February | March | | |
| Type of Muslim Actor | Islamic organisations | Count | 4 | 1 | 9 | 17 | 59 | 23 | 113 |
| | | % within MUSLIMTYPE | 3,5% | ,9% | 8,0% | 15,0% | 52,2% | 20,4% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 19,0% | 50,0% | 50,0% | 37,8% | 59,6% | 56,1% | 50,0% |
| | Muslim protest coalition | Count | 9 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 28 |
| | | % within MUSLIMTYPE | 32,1% | ,0% | 10,7% | 28,6% | 10,7% | 17,9% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 42,9% | ,0% | 16,7% | 17,8% | 3,0% | 12,2% | 12,4% |
| | Muslim religious authorities | Count | 4 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 21 | 12 | 55 |
| | | % within MUSLIMTYPE | 7,3% | ,0% | 10,9% | 21,8% | 38,2% | 21,8% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 19,0% | ,0% | 33,3% | 26,7% | 21,2% | 29,3% | 24,3% |
| | "Ambassadors of Islam" | Count | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 10 | 1 | 21 |
| | | % within MUSLIMTYPE | 9,5% | 4,8% | ,0% | 33,3% | 47,6% | 4,8% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 9,5% | 50,0% | ,0% | 15,6% | 10,1% | 2,4% | 9,3% |
| | Muslims as unorganised collective | Count | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 9 |
| | | % within MUSLIMTYPE | 22,2% | ,0% | ,0% | 11,1% | 66,7% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 9,5% | ,0% | ,0% | 2,2% | 6,1% | ,0% | 4,0% |
| Total | | Count | 21 | 2 | 18 | 45 | 99 | 41 | 226 |
| | | % within MUSLIMTYPE | 9,3% | ,9% | 8,0% | 19,9% | 43,8% | 18,1% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |

Figure 7: Development in Shares of Total Muslim Claims by Central Islamic Organisations

| | | | MONTH | | | | | | Total |
|--------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---------|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------|--------|
| | | | October | November | December | January | February | March | |
| Islamic org. | Muslimer i dialog | Count | 4 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 41 | 11 | 64 |
| | | % within MUSORG | 6,3% | ,0% | 6,3% | 6,3% | 64,1% | 17,2% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 10,5% | ,0% | 16,7% | 6,3% | 27,3% | 15,9% | 18,2% |
| | Kritiske Muslimer | Count | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 16 |
| | | % within MUSORG | 6,3% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 68,8% | 25,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 2,6% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 7,3% | 5,8% | 4,5% |
| | Muslim protest coalitio | Count | 18 | 0 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 11 | 51 |
| | | % within MUSORG | 35,3% | ,0% | 9,8% | 27,5% | 5,9% | 21,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 47,4% | ,0% | 20,8% | 21,9% | 2,0% | 15,9% | 14,5% |
| | Islamisk Trossamfund | Count | 3 | 4 | 11 | 31 | 21 | 16 | 86 |
| | | % within MUSORG | 3,5% | 4,7% | 12,8% | 36,0% | 24,4% | 18,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 7,9% | 57,1% | 45,8% | 48,4% | 14,0% | 23,2% | 24,4% |
| | Demokratiske Muslime | Count | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 27 | 18 | 57 |
| | | % within MUSORG | ,0% | ,0% | 3,5% | 17,5% | 47,4% | 31,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | ,0% | ,0% | 8,3% | 15,6% | 18,0% | 26,1% | 16,2% |
| | Hizb ut-Tahrir | Count | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 7 | 33 |
| | | % within MUSORG | 9,1% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 69,7% | 21,2% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 7,9% | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 15,3% | 10,1% | 9,4% |
| | The Network | Count | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 13 |
| | | % within MUSORG | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 15,4% | 69,2% | 15,4% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | ,0% | ,0% | ,0% | 3,1% | 6,0% | 2,9% | 3,7% |
| | others | Count | 9 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 15 | 0 | 32 |
| | | % within MUSORG | 28,1% | 9,4% | 6,3% | 9,4% | 46,9% | ,0% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 23,7% | 42,9% | 8,3% | 4,7% | 10,0% | ,0% | 9,1% |
| Total | | Count | 38 | 7 | 24 | 64 | 150 | 69 | 352 |
| | | % within MUSORG | 10,8% | 2,0% | 6,8% | 18,2% | 42,6% | 19,6% | 100,0% |
| | | % within MONTH | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% | 100,0% |